Nebraska Law Review
Volume 45 | Issue 3

Article 10

1966

Revocable Inter Vivos Trusts versus the Statutory
Share
William C. Owen
University of Nebraska College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
Recommended Citation
William C. Owen, Revocable Inter Vivos Trusts versus the Statutory Share, 45 Neb. L. Rev. 603 (1966)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol45/iss3/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

REVOCABLE INTER VIVOS TRUSTS VERSUS
THE STATUTORY SHARE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Nebraska as in many other states, a person, during his lifetime, may dispose of personal property either by gift or otherwise so
as to completely vitiate the statutory share of a surviving spouse.'
One method employed by donors in attempting to effect inter vivos
transfers of property is the so-called living revocable trust.
This method is particularly attractive to the settlor since he not
only enjoys a power of revocation, but may also reserve a life inter2
est in the income arising from the investment of the trust res.
While most courts are agreed that such a trust is a valid non-testamentary disposition,3 there seems to be some disagreement as to
whether this type of trust device should also prevail against the
claim of a surviving spouse.4 The dispute on this question does not
arise from a propensity by some courts to restrict the alienability
of property in the favor of the surviving spouse. The dispute
arises because some courts have held that in a revocable inter
vivos trust, the settlor, so far as his or her spouse is concerned, has
not in fact departed with the substantial rights and powers of ownership so as to effectuate an alienation of the trust property.
STAT. § 30-107 (Reissue 1964) provides that a surviving
spouse may elect in lieu of a will to take by "descent and distribution
the interest in the estate of the deceased provided by law." NEs. R.v.
STAT. § 30-103 (Reissue 1964) entitles a surviving spouse to a statutory share of the personal property of the deceased spouse. This distribution is the same as a spouse is entitled to under NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 30-101 (Reissue 1964) which provides tor a statutory share in real
property.
2 A typical example of such a trust is as follows: Settlor, by an inter
vivos conveyance, transfers certain personal property to T as trustee
to manage and invest at T's discretion. The trust is to be paid to the
settlor for life, and on death of the settlor, T is to pay the principal
to C. The instrument further reserves in the settlor during his lifetime the power to modify or entirely revoke the trust. This trust is
similar to the example given in RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRusTs § 57,
comment c (1959).
3 Whalen v. Swircin, 141 Neb. 650, 4 N.W.2d 737 (1942). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRusTs § 57, comment d (1959); 1 ScoTT,
TRusTs § 57.2 (2d ed. 1956); Annot. 49 A.L.R.2d 521 (1956).
4 The Restatement provides that such trusts are valid against the claim
of a surviving spouse: RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRusTs § 57 (1959);

1 NEB. REv.

See 1 ScoTr, TRUSTs § 57.5 n.4 (2d ed. 1956); Contra, Bolles v. Toledo
Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1944), overruled in Smyth
v. Cleveland Trust Co., 172 Ohio St. 489, 179 N.E.2d 60 (1961); Ackers
v. First Nat'l Bank, 192 Kan. 319, 387 P.2d 840 (1963); Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (1944). See also Newman
v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
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Although Nebraska has not become a participant in this dispute,5 the probability is great that it will be compelled to do so in
the near future.
II.

THE FRAUDULENT TRANSFER TEST

There are numerous cases employing the words "fraudulent" or
"colorable" to designate transfers which have been held to violate
the statutory interest of a surviving spouse.6 In some of these
cases it is apparent that the courts have used this terminology to
describe a mere device by which the husband attempts to keep for
himself the benefit of his property during his lifetime and at the
same time, deprive his spouse of her statutory interest at his
death. Although use of the term "fraudulent" in such cases varies
substantially from its usual connotation, its use is not entirely illchosen for the purpose of describing a test based on the intention
of the donor. The exact meaning of the term "fraudulent" and its
related test is well expounded in In re Sides' Estate7 a Nebraska
case.
In the Sides case a father, during his lifetime, gave money to
each of his children by a former marriage and immediately took in
return promissory notes for the full indebtedness. Each note contained a written provision that such note should be cancelled on
the death of the payee and not be a claim against the maker.
The father then delivered the notes to a trustee with directions
to collect and remit the interest to him during the remainder of his
lifetime and to surrender the notes to the makers on the father's
death. Thereupon, the father never exercised any dominion or control over the notes. On the father's death his widow sought to include the notes in the estate for the purpose of attaching her statutory share. After first holding that the trusts constituted absolute inter vivos gifts, the court discussed the contention that the
transfers were fraudulent as to the widow. On this issue the
court stated the applicable test as follows:
[S]ubstantially all authority is to the effect that the question of
good faith is controlling. If the transfer of personal property by
the husband during his lifetime is a mere device and means by
which he retains to himself the use and benefit of the property
the widow
during his lifetime, and at his death seeks to deprive
of her statutory share, it is fraudulent as to the wife.8
5 In re Sides' Estate, 119 Neb. 314, 228 N.W. 619 (1930), discussed infra,

concerned the marital
irrevocable trust.
6 See generally, Annot.,
7 119 Neb. 314, 228 N.W.
8 Id. at 323, 228 N.W. at

rights of a surviving spouse in relation to an
49 A.L.R.2d 521 (1956).
619 (1930).
622.

COMMENTS
If the court had simply applied the foregoing statement, the
Sides case could be read to mean that the term "fraudulent" was
used to describe the method or device utilized to effectuate the
transfer and had nothing to do with the motive of the donor in
making the transfer. Under this interpretation, the critical question in any case would be whether the powers and beneficial rights
of ownership reserved in the donor or settlor are of sufficient extent to render the transfer a mere device and therefor ineffective
against the claim of a surviving spouse. However, the court was
not content to conclude its opinion with the quoted portion above.
In the next paragraph it reasoned that the burden was on the widow
to prove that the settlor, in making the gifts to the beneficiaries,
was actuated by bad motive and fraudulent intent.9 Thus, the
true test emerging from the Sides case is two-fold: (1) The trust
transaction must appear as a mere device by which the settlor
retains the use and benefit of the property to the exclusion of the
widow's interest, and; (2) the intent of the settlor in creating the
device must be substantially directed toward depriving the widow
of her statutory share-there must be substantial evidence of bad
faith or ill-will against the widow.
So far as the Sides case typifies the cases adhering to the
fraudulent transfer test, it was precisely the bad motive element
of the test that eventually led to its complete rejection in the
leading case of Newman v. Dore.'0 It was this case that set out
the doctrine of illusory transfers.
III. THE ILLUSORY TRANSFER TEST
In Newman the settlor, a few days prior to his death, conveyed
substantially all of his real and personal property to trustees, retaining not only the income for life and the power to revoke the
trust, but also the power to control the trustees in the management
of the trust. The court specifically rejected motive or fraudulent
intent as a proper test on the grounds that there must first exist
some right accruing to the widow which is capable of being defrauded. 1 The court reasoned that the only sound test was wheth9 "On the issue of fraud presented, the burden of proof is upon the surviving widow to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that, in
making these gifts to his children, the father was actuated by.bad
motive and fraudulent intent, and that the entire transaction was a
mere device by which he sought to defraud her." Id. at 323, 228 N.W.
at 622.
10 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
11 "Motive or intent is an unsatisfactory test of the validity of a transfer
of property .... Intent may, at times, be relevant in determining
whether an act is fraudulent, but there can be no fraud where no
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er the husband had in good faith divested himself of ownership of
2
his property or had made an illusory transfer.1
While the Newman case completely rejects the fraudulent
intent requirement, it does not completely abandon all requirement
of intent. Under its doctrine, a transfer is said to be illusory when
the settlor did not intend a good faith divestment of the property,
but this does not mean that there has to be a finding of actual intent. Such intent may be determined by the extent of actual
divestment of the property.
So far as the Newman case rejects the requirement of a finding of bad motive or fraudulent intent its logic would appear sound
and should be followed in Nebraska. This would entail a healthy
explanation if not an express overruling of the Sides case. However, before Nebraska extends complete approval to the illusory
doctrine, it should consider the various ramifications implicit in
the doctrine concerning testamentary and non-testamentary transfers.
IV.

SOME RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ILLUSORY TEST

Briefly, the illusory test can be stated in terms of whether the
settlor intended in good faith to divest himself of the property.
As indicated by the Newman decision the test may be independent
of an inquiry as to whether the trust is testamentary in the conventional sense.'8 Thus, it is conceivable that a given trust may be
reached by a surviving spouse yet at the same time remain impervious to an attack by the personal representative of the settlor.
As a corollary to this conclusion, it is also conceivable that a given
trust, when attacked by a spouse, may only be declared invalid to
the extent necessary to satisfy the spouse's statutory share-the remainder of the trust property passing unaffected to the designated
beneficiary. Both of these conclusions, however, depend on the
existence of a real difference between an attack by a surviving
spouse and an attack by the personal representative of the settlor.
Historically, the tests for determining the testamentary or
non-testamentary nature of inter vivos transfers were developed
right of any person is invaded.

'The great weight of authority is that

the intent to defeat a claim which otherwise a wife might have is not
enough to defeat the deed.'" Id. at 379, 9 N.E.2d at 968.
Id. at 379, 9 N.E.2d at 969.
13 "We do not now consider whether . . .the reserved power of control
is so great that the trustee is in fact 'the agent of the settlor.' We
assume, without deciding, that except for the provisions of section 18
of the Decedent Estate Law the trust would be valid." Id. at 380, 9
N.E.2d at 969.
12

COMMENTS
along lines to insure and protect the intention of the donor. Because of the stringent and inflexible formalities and requirements of the Statute of Wills, courts strove to avoid the statute by
subtle distinctions between interests created inter vivos but subject to future enjoyment and interests which were not intended to
arise at all until the death of the donor. However, in no way were
the various rules designed to afford protection to the designated
heirs of the donor claiming through his personal representative.
Thus, a donor by a revocable trust device was enabled to retain
almost all the benefits of ownership and at his death effectuate a
transfer of the property free and clear of his estate.
With the advent of the statutory share accruing to the surviving spouse coupled with the right of election, complete protection
was accorded the spouse against any and all donative intent of the
donor as contained in a valid will. The question that immediately
arises and the real question that confronted the court in the Newman case was whether the conventional tests for determining the
testamentary nature of a given transfer can be applied so as to give
adequate protection to the interest of a surviving spouse. Obviously, in Newman the court reasoned that the conventional tests
were inadequate for this purpose, for the court assumed that the
trust was valid except for the challenge by the widow. 14 In setting out a test to accord protection to a surviving spouse, the court
was concerned with the substance of the transfer-the degree of
retention of the important elements of ownership-rather than the
mere form and appearance of the transfer. 15 Having satisfied itself that the trust did not suffice to divest the settlor of the important rights and powers of ownership, the court was prepared to
say that insofar as the widow alone is concerned, the trust property
is to be treated as part of the settlor's estate.
To the extent that the illusory test is directed only toward the
protection of the interest of a surviving spouse, it reasonably follows that once the test has served this purpose, its application
should terminate, leaving the remainder of the transfer-the portion not needed to satisfy the claim of the surviving spouse-to be
adjudicated in accordance with the general rules relating to testamentary and non-testamentary transactions. This may mean that
Ibid.
15 "Perhaps 'from the technical point of view such a conveyance does not
quite take back all that it gives, but practically it does.'. . . Judged
by the substance, not by the form, the testator's conveyance is illusory,
intended only as a mask for the effective retention by the settlor of
the property which in form he had conveyed." Id. at 381, 9 N.E.2d at
969.
14
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the remainder of the trust will pass to the beneficiary free and
clear of the claims of the personal representative of the estate.
V.

ACCEPTANCE AND GROWTH OF THE ILLUSORY
DOCTRINE

Although Newman v. Dore has been widely accepted as setting
forth a correct test for determining the effectiveness of an inter
vivos trust against the claims of a surviving spouse, most jurisdictions have been somewhat hesitant in extending recognition to
the various ramifications of the doctrine.
In New York the distinction between the validity of a trust
per se and the validity in relation to the claim of a surviving
spouse was expressly rejected in In re Halpern's Estate,16 decided
some fourteen years after the Newman case. The precise issue
before the court was whether a "Totten" or tentative trust was
illusory under the rule of Newman. After first overruling the
Appellate Division by deciding that such trusts were not illusory,
the court went to great lengths to reject the lower court's conclusion that the trusts were illusory only to the extent necessary to
17
satisfy the widow's claim.
Although the distinction was completely repudiated in New
York, it did receive some recognition in other jurisdictions. One
such case is Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co.'8 In this case a husband
transferred personal property to a trustee under an agreement
whereby the husband reserved the income to himself for life and
also the right to amend or revoke the trust. The settlor's spouse
was made a life beneficiary of the trust to the extent of 500 dollars
per month. The validity of this type of trust was established by
statute with an exception in favor of creditors. In holding the
trust invalid against the claim of the settlor's widow, the court
reasoned that a widow had a greater interest than a creditor even
though her interest was not expressly protected by the statute;
nevertheless the court was careful to point out that it was not
declaring the trust totally invalid but only voidable at the instance of the widow to the extent necessary to satisfy her distributive share. 19
16

303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951).

"We see no power in the courts to divide up such a Totten trust and
call part of it illusory and the other part good. The only test is that
quoted above, from Newman v. Dore, . . . .and the result of its application would necessarily be either total validity or total invalidity, as
to any one transfer." Id. at 40, 100 N.E.2d at 123.
'8 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1944).
19 "Therefore, we are led to the conclusion that as to the widow, trusts
17

COMMENTS
The Bolles case was good law in Ohio until 1960 when it was
expressly overruled in Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co. 20 Part of
the grounds relied on in rejecting the Bolles case apparently rested
to recognize a trust as paron the court's inability or unwillingness
21
tially valid and partially invalid.
The Smyth decision had a definite dampening effect on the
growth and acceptance of the dual validity characteristic of a
given trust in respect to the claim of a surviving spouse. However,
22
other decisions have done much to lend vitality to the distinction.
23
A recent and interesting case is In re Jeruzal's Estate. This case
involved numerous savings account trusts which the settlor had
created for the obvious purpose of reducing his wife's share of his
estate. Previous decisions following the doctrine of Matter of Totten24 accorded validity to this type of trust. Although the Minnesota cases dealing generally with fraud on the marital rights were
confusing, the court concluded that the applicable test for adjudicating the rights of a surviving spouse was whether the transaction was real or illusory. However, under this doctrine, as it was
interpreted in the Halpern case, a widow could not reach the balance remaining in trust since the trust was real. At this point instead of rejecting the interpretation of the illusory test as contained
in the Halpern case, the court abandoned the test in favor of the
Restatement rule,25 which in the case of "Totten" trusts, permits

20
21

This criticism does not necesNos. 331 and 520 were illusory....
sarily affect the validity of either of these trusts... but it is intended
to show that such trusts may not be used as a device to deprive the
widow of her distributive share of the property possessed by her husband at the time of his death. To the extent that such an arrangement, if allowed to stand, would deprive the widow of her distributive
share of the property, it is voidable at the instance of the widow." Id.
at 212, 58 N.E.2d at 390.
172 Ohio St. 489, 179 N.E.2d 60 (1961).
"It is here observed that the statute gave validity to Bolles' trust and
made no exception in the wife's favor. Furthermore, if . . . the wife

was entitled to her share in the 'property possessed by her husband,'
then the entire trust should have failed, as the trustee was possessed
of no property." Id. at 500, 179 N.E.2d at 68.
22 Accord, Ackers v. First Nat'l Bank, 192 Kan. 319, 387 P.2d 840 (1963);
Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 IM. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (1944).
23 269 Minn. 183, 130 N.W.2d 473 (1964).
This case held that where a person
24 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
deposits funds in a savings account in his own name as trustee for
another, in the absence of evidence that an irrevocable trust was intended or that no trust at all was intended, the law will infer from
the form of the deposit that the depositor intended to create a revocable trust.
25 'Vewould prefer the Restatement rule, by which the beneficiaries
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the surviving spouse to reach the trust res to the extent necessary to satisfy his or her statutory share. Due to the widespread
use of "Totten" trusts and the reliance which was felt to have
been doubtlessly placed on its former decisions dealing with marital rights, the court reasoned that it could not apply a new rule of
law in the instant case. Although the plaintiff widow was not
accorded relief, the court made it clear that it would feel free to
adopt the Restatement rule should the legislature fail to act on
the matter.
This case is interesting from the standpoint that it offers an
illustration of the position that courts might work themselves into
by failing to appreciate the real nature of the illusory test. In the
Jeruzal case, had the Minnesota court recognized that the illusory
test is limited solely to the interest of a surviving spouse and is
not applicable to a determination of whether a transfer might otherwise be valid, it might have easily accorded the widow relief
without the risks of upsetting the reliance placed on its former decisions. If this approach had been followed the caveat would
have been unnecessary.
VI. WHEN IS A TRUST ILLUSORY
What has been said so far is merely to emphasize two points
which should be considered by the Nebraska court in attempting to
resolve the statutory claim of a surviving spouse. (1) The court
should reject the fraudulent transfer test as contained in the Sides
case in favor of the illusory test as stated in Newman v. Dore.
(2) The court should recognize that a determination of a transfer
as illusory does not necessarily mean that the transaction is entirely invalid, but only voidable at the instance of the surviving
receive what the decedent intended them to have except so far as the
trust funds are necessary to satisfy the statutory interest of the spouse
after the general assets of the estate have been exhausted." In re
Jeruzal's Estate, 269 Minn. 183, 195, 130 N.W.2d 473, 481 (1964). The
court is referring to RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRusTs § 58, comment e
(1959). This section provides in part: "Although the surviving spouse
in claiming his or her statutory distributive share of the estate of the
decedent is not entitled to include in the estate property transferred
during his lifetime by the decedent in trust for himself for life with
remainder to others, even though the decedent reserves a power of
revocation, the surviving spouse of a person who makes a savings deposit upon a tentative trust can include the deposit in computing the
share to which such surviving spouse is entitled.
"Although the amount which the surviving spouse is entitled to
receive is measured by the sum of the decedent's owned assets and
the amount of such deposits, the owned assets are to be first applied
to the satisfaction of the claim of the surviving spouse. .. "

COMMENTS
spouse to the extent necessary to satisfy his or her statutory share.

With these points in mind, the real difficulty will arise in ascertaining whether a given trust is real or illusory.
While the illusory test is couched in terms of "intent to di-

vest", it is submitted that a finding of "intent" or lack of "intent"
is dependent entirely on the extent to which the challenged trust
has in reality removed the operative powers of ownership from
the settlor. Basically, such powers can be classified into two categories: (1) dominion; (2) control. As the term dominion is here
used, it refers to the power and the right of the settlor to restore
the trust property to his exclusive use and control free and clear
of the trust. As the term control is here used, it refers to the
power and right of the settlor to direct the management of the
trust property without terminating the trust.
In the trust involved in the Newman case, the settlor surrendered neither dominion nor control. He was as much the
owner of the property in trust as if nothing had occurred despite
the fact that by a declaration of trust, the law vested legal title in
the trustee. It is difficult to see how this situation is materially
changed where the settlor only surrenders control such as occurs
in the usual revocable trust and also in the "Totten" or tenative
trust cases. 26 By surrendering the right to control, it may be
argued that the settlor has evidenced some intent that the transaction is not a mere sham. Undoubtedly this is true and some
courts have limited the illusory doctrine to situations where the
trust transaction appears to be no more than a mere sham.27 However, there is no good reason to warrant such a narrow application
of the doctrine. By retaining the power to revoke, the settlor
may restore the trust property to his exclusive and complete ownership by the exercise of his own volition. In the dynamic sense,
the settlor is the owner of the trust res and should be treated
accordingly for the purpose of satisfying the statutory share of a
surviving spouse.
VII. CONCLUSION
Presently, in most jurisdictions a person by means of a revocable inter vivos trust may control and benefit from property
until death and at the same time successfully prevent his or her
26

27

In a tentative or Totten trust, in reality the settlor has no control over
the management and investment of the trust since the funds are in the
hands of the bank. In order to exercise control, the settlor must
revoke the trust either in toto or in part. Of course, these trusts can
be easily revoked since the formalities involved are rather simple.
E.g., Kerwin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 299 (1945).
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surviving spouse from asserting any interest whatsoever in the
trust property. At least one state has been swayed by the policy in
favor of the surviving spouse and has passed legislation removing
the effectiveness of such a device.2 8 The problem has not yet
arisen in Nebraska. It is submitted that the question can be soundly resolved in this state by judicial means. One approach which
the court may adopt is the illusory doctrine. Applied in its most
logical form, this test permits the court to invalidate a given trust
only to the extent necessary to satisfy the claim of a surviving
spouse. In this regard, the test measures the interest of a surviving
spouse by the substance of the transaction without placing undue
restrictions on the alienation of property.
William C. Owen '67

tit. 20, § 301.11 (Supp. 1965).
"Conveyances to defeat marital rights.
(a) In general. A conveyance of assets by a person who retains
a power of appointment by will, or a power of revocation or consumption over the principal thereof, shall at the election of his surviving spouse, be treated as a testamentary disposition so far as the
surviving spouse is concerned to the extent to which the power has
been reserved, but the rights of the surviving spouse shall be subject
to the rights of any income beneficiary whose interest in income becomes vested in enjoyment prior to the death of the conveyor. .. "

28 PA. STAT. ANN.

